Evidentialism: A Critique
- Steve Curtis
While the field of Christian apologetics has been subjected to a variety of taxonomical divisions, most categorizations group the various methodologies into two broad types: evidential and non-evidential (though there are many subsets within these two). Evidentialism may be defined as a method that begins with common ground between the Christian and the non-Christian (i.e., logic and reason) and “tends to focus chiefly on the legitimacy of accumulating various historical and other inductive arguments for the truth of Christianity.”[1] This method has found advocates in J. Oliver Buswell, Jr., Josh McDowell, Lee Strobel, Gary Habermas, John Warwick Montgomery, and Wolfhart Pannenberg.
Evidentialism can generally be understood as an eclectic collection of arguments for the truths of Christianity, and evidences against the falsity of other worldviews. These arguments may be philosophical, historical, or scientific (among other possibilities). Whatever the argument employed, however, the Evidentialist approaches his task with at least two presuppositions: 1) the noetic structure of the apologist’s audience is rational and sound; and 2) theism in general, and Christian theism in particular, must rest upon sufficient foundational (or basic) beliefs.
I do not dispute the rationality of the philosophical or historical arguments, for truth can be neither illogical nor unreasonable. My concern is not with the arguments but with the mind that is receiving the information. I question that mind’s objectivity and intellectual honesty, especially when it is confronted with a notion that would force a total reversal of one’s worldview and demand that autonomy be replaced with worship. “[O]ne’s moral condition can stand in the way of recognizing even that which is self-evident (especially when the sinfulness that one loves so deeply is that which is being exposed and threatened).”[2] Thus, philosophical arguments which, in and of themselves, are wholly rational and consistent, may not penetrate the formidable obstacle constructed by a sinful and hostile will. The will may, in fact, cause one to believe sincerely (though also, of course, foolishly) in an irrational idea. Consequently, whenever a presentation of a theistic or historical proof (a rational position) is ineffective or rejected (an irrational response), it is the result of a depraved will. Evidentialism may admit to the potentiality of sin to obstruct rational comprehension of truth but it is my contention that this sinful proclivity is universal and absolute. As George Marsden has said, “Although all people have an innate sense of God, this natural relation was so broken and injured by sin as to be of no use in its present state as a foundation for knowing God truly.”[3] Only the Holy Spirit’s work in the heart can cause any “proof” to be received as truth.
Against the second presupposition of Evidentialism, Alvin Plantinga makes the point that belief in God is, in fact, properly basic. He says that, “This [belief in God] is the natural human condition; it is because of our presently unnatural sinful condition that many of us find belief in God difficult or absurd.”[4] In other words, the task of the apologist is not to convince his hearer with a preponderance of the evidence, but rather simply to present the truths of God and trust that the Holy Spirit will remove the scales of sin from their eyes and reveal the truths of Christ.
Thus, while I wholeheartedly agree that Evidentialism presents valid arguments, I have considerable doubt as to the effectiveness of those arguments. Perhaps, in the first case, the arguments may fall on deaf ears. Or, in the second, they may not even be necessary, as God may choose to reveal Himself “from the inside out,” electing to use any number of external stimuli to awaken the innate sensus divinitatus ("sense of the divine" - Calvin) that comes with humanity as standard equipment. Either way, the Evidentialist would do well to not measure his effectiveness by his results.
[1] Cowan, Steven B. Editor, Five Views on Apologetics, Zondervan, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 2000, 17.
[2] 3 George Marsden, “American Evangelical Academia,” in Faith and Rationality, ed.Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 240.
[3] Ibid, 249.
[4] 6 Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” idem, 66.
Evidentialism can generally be understood as an eclectic collection of arguments for the truths of Christianity, and evidences against the falsity of other worldviews. These arguments may be philosophical, historical, or scientific (among other possibilities). Whatever the argument employed, however, the Evidentialist approaches his task with at least two presuppositions: 1) the noetic structure of the apologist’s audience is rational and sound; and 2) theism in general, and Christian theism in particular, must rest upon sufficient foundational (or basic) beliefs.
I do not dispute the rationality of the philosophical or historical arguments, for truth can be neither illogical nor unreasonable. My concern is not with the arguments but with the mind that is receiving the information. I question that mind’s objectivity and intellectual honesty, especially when it is confronted with a notion that would force a total reversal of one’s worldview and demand that autonomy be replaced with worship. “[O]ne’s moral condition can stand in the way of recognizing even that which is self-evident (especially when the sinfulness that one loves so deeply is that which is being exposed and threatened).”[2] Thus, philosophical arguments which, in and of themselves, are wholly rational and consistent, may not penetrate the formidable obstacle constructed by a sinful and hostile will. The will may, in fact, cause one to believe sincerely (though also, of course, foolishly) in an irrational idea. Consequently, whenever a presentation of a theistic or historical proof (a rational position) is ineffective or rejected (an irrational response), it is the result of a depraved will. Evidentialism may admit to the potentiality of sin to obstruct rational comprehension of truth but it is my contention that this sinful proclivity is universal and absolute. As George Marsden has said, “Although all people have an innate sense of God, this natural relation was so broken and injured by sin as to be of no use in its present state as a foundation for knowing God truly.”[3] Only the Holy Spirit’s work in the heart can cause any “proof” to be received as truth.
Against the second presupposition of Evidentialism, Alvin Plantinga makes the point that belief in God is, in fact, properly basic. He says that, “This [belief in God] is the natural human condition; it is because of our presently unnatural sinful condition that many of us find belief in God difficult or absurd.”[4] In other words, the task of the apologist is not to convince his hearer with a preponderance of the evidence, but rather simply to present the truths of God and trust that the Holy Spirit will remove the scales of sin from their eyes and reveal the truths of Christ.
Thus, while I wholeheartedly agree that Evidentialism presents valid arguments, I have considerable doubt as to the effectiveness of those arguments. Perhaps, in the first case, the arguments may fall on deaf ears. Or, in the second, they may not even be necessary, as God may choose to reveal Himself “from the inside out,” electing to use any number of external stimuli to awaken the innate sensus divinitatus ("sense of the divine" - Calvin) that comes with humanity as standard equipment. Either way, the Evidentialist would do well to not measure his effectiveness by his results.
[1] Cowan, Steven B. Editor, Five Views on Apologetics, Zondervan, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 2000, 17.
[2] 3 George Marsden, “American Evangelical Academia,” in Faith and Rationality, ed.Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 240.
[3] Ibid, 249.
[4] 6 Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” idem, 66.
